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Migrations historically have led to fears of “brain drain” from the sending regions because many studies 
show that the more highly skilled and motivated people are more likely to migrate. South Africa provides a 
natural testing ground for the study of brain drains because the Apartheid system, which ended in the early 
1990s, had long constrained the locational choices of black migrants of all skill levels. As apartheid was 
being dismantled, new opportunities  for  movement opened up to black  workers, leading to a surge in 
internal migration.  We first analyze whether migration patterns of Black South Africans during the period 
1992 to 1996 match the predictions of the two seminal papers, Roy (1951) and Sjaastad (1962), where 
individuals are hypothesized to be income-maximizers. The results from conditional logit regressions on 
individual  choices  among  318  locations  show  that  they  do.  Individuals  prefer  localities  with  higher 
expected log wages regardless of their educations and skills. More importantly, workers with at least some 
matriculation tend to favor areas where a higher share of the population attended high school.  In contrast, 
workers who did not attend high school find such areas less attractive. Over the study period, brain drain 
arose among blacks within South Africa: the share of high-educated residents in areas with high shares of 
high schooling increased. 
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The issue of brain drain is often a significant part of discussions of migration.   Most studies 
suggest that migration leads to self-selection of highly motivated and more educated workers 
(Polachek  and  Horvath,  1977  and  Plane,  1993).   As  a  result,  many  areas  experiencing  out-
migration complain of drains of skilled and more productive workers and establish policies to 
prevent  such  a  drain.   For  example,  many  states  in  the  South  in  the  U.S.  during  the  1910s 
established laws limiting activities by labor agents who were recruiting productive black workers 
to  move  North  and  work  in  mining  and  manufacturing  (Higgs,  1980).   Meanwhile,  many 
countries  try  to  find  ways  to  prevent  the  potential  loss  of  highly  skilled  workers  from 
international migration.   
South  Africa  at  the end  of  apartheid  provides  an  excellent setting  for  examining  the 
movements of skilled and unskilled workers in internal migrations.  Between 1947 and 1991 the 
South  African  government  had  established  an  Apartheid  system  with  up  to  317  laws  that 
discriminated against black workers.  Quite a few of the laws restricted the locations where blacks 
could live and work.  This system of Apartheid was dismantled in the mid 1980s through early 
1990s, with the final official limit on movement ending when the Group Areas Act of 1950 was 
repealed in 1991. The elimination of apartheid released black workers and households to migrate 
to all sorts of new locations in the 1990s.  This nationwide elimination of the artificial constraint 
on movement offers a quasi-experimental opportunity to examine how the migration patterns of 
skilled and unskilled workers differ.  
Building on the insights from A. D. Roy (1951), George Borjas et al. (1992) and Gordon 
Dahl (2002) have developed empirical models for the migration patterns of skilled and unskilled 
workers.  Generally, they find that skilled workers tend to migrate to areas where the returns to 




returns of individual black workers.  The first is returns to individuals‟ observable characteristics 
such as age and schooling. The second is a measure of returns for each worker that is attributable 
to characteristics not observed by the researcher.  These skills are unobservable to the researcher 
but might well be observed by the participants in the market.  We develop a proxy measure of this 
unobservable skill by estimating wage regressions as a function of schooling, age, and other 
traditional measures. The normal standardized residual from that regression for each individual is 
then used as a measure of skill unobservable to the econometrician.           
To  measure  the  return  to  skills,  we  estimate  wage  regressions  for  each  of  318 
administrative districts in South Africa.  For each region we therefore have a measure of the 
returns to observable characteristics – the predicted log wage.  As a measure of the returns to 
skills  unobservable  to  the  econometrician,  we  need  two  factors  –  the  normal  standardized 
residuals from the wage regressions as a measure of each individual‟s unobservable skills and the 
standard  deviation  of  those  residuals,  which  can  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  returns  to  the 
unobservable skills. We then multiply the individual‟s unobservable skill by the proxy for returns 
to  estimate  the  total  returns  to  unobservable  skills  for  each  individual  at  each  specific  area. 
According  to  traditional  theoretical  papers,  Roy  (1951)  and  Sjaastad  (1962),  individuals  are 
hypothesized to be income-maximizers. Hence, blacks South Africans are also expected to prefer 
higher returns to both observable characteristics and unobservable characteristics. 
Whilst testing the income-maximizing hypothesis, we test if the internal migration after 
the formal elimination of apartheid engenders brain drain within South Africa. We include the 
share of people who attended high school in an area as a regional characteristic that individuals 
either  favor  or  disfavor  based  on  their  educational  attainments.  We  expect  that  more  highly 
educated workers tend to move to areas in which there is a higher share of the population who are 




workers tend to avoid moving to areas where there are higher shares of the population who are 
more highly educated. 
Using the sample of individual black male workers, we then estimate a conditional logit 
(CLOGIT) model in which individuals choose among 318 magisterial districts in South Africa. 
The  model  incorporates information  about  the  characteristics  of  the  magisterial  districts, and 
nonparametrically incorporates the characteristics of the individuals‟ educational levels.  We first 
investigate the income-maximizing behavior of individuals predicted by theoretical models in 
migration literature. The coefficients of the predicted log wage and the returns to unobservable 
characteristics will test the hypothesis conditional on other amenities. The results confirm that 
economic incentives are critical factors when black South Africans made migration decisions, 
controlling  for  other  regional  characteristics.  However,  our  measure  of  the  returns  to 
unobservable characteristics does not play a statistically significant role in the blacks‟ choice of 
locations.  More importantly, while workers with at least some high school attendance tend to 
favor areas where the share of the population with high schooling is higher, workers with less 
education disfavor those areas, holding constant other regional characteristics. Over the study 
period,  brain  drain  arose  among  blacks  within  South  Africa,  as  the  share  of  high-educated 
residents in areas with high shares of high schooling increased.   
 
2.  APARTHEID POLICY AND THE EFFECT OF ITS DEMISE 
 
Apartheid means „Separateness‟ in Afrikaans. It was a system of racial segregation that was 
enforced in South Africa from 1948 to 1991.  Apartheid was legally established in South Africa 
through 317 laws that restricted nearly every aspect of black living.  A partial list of apartheid 




such as land issues, jobs, housing, living areas, personal relationships, constitutional rights, and 
general rights. 
Apartheid was officially incorporated into the South African government when the white 
Afrikaner Nationalist Party came to power in 1948. In 1949 and 1950, the apartheid government 
enacted the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts. Under these laws, marrying a person of a 
different race was illegal and it was also a criminal offense for a white person to have any sexual 
relations with a person of a different race.  Around this time, the Population Registration Act 
required all citizens of South Africa to be classified into categories according to their race. The 
categories established were white, black (African), and colored
4. In 1950, the Group Areas Act 
divided the lands in which blacks and whites resided into distinct residential zones. This act 
established the distinct areas of South Africa in which members of each race could live and work, 
typically setting aside the best urban, industrial, and agricultural areas for whites. Blacks were 
restricted from renting or even occupying property in the areas deemed as „white-zones‟ unless 
they had received permission from the state to do so. 
The  establishment  of  the  Bantu  Self-Government  Act  in  1950  created  the  „bantustans‟ 
(homelands) for the black population based upon their tribal groupings. Blacks were stripped of 
their rights to participate in the national government of South Africa when the Bantu Authorities 
Act  was  established.  Ratified  in  1951,  the  Bantu  Authorities  Act  created  a  basis  for  ethnic 
government in African reserves, known as the „homelands‟. These homelands were established by 
the national government to function as independent states.
5   Black Africans were assigned to a 
homeland based on their tribal grouping, which was in accordance with their record of origin. In 
reality, however, a majority of  black South Africans had never resided in these „homelands‟.  
Voting and all other political rights were restricted to the designated homeland. The objective of 
                                                 
4 Colored corresponds to racially mixed individuals. 
5 There were 10 different homelands in South Africa. Among these, four were nominally independent, so-
called TVBC states of the Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei. The other six had limited self-




creating  homelands  was  to  force  Africans  to  maintain  loyalty  to  their  respective  homeland, 
thereby  relinquishing  their  South  African  citizenship. The  government  hoped  that  this  would 
result in blacks not being able to participate in the South African Parliament. The homeland 
administrators, who sought to maintain political rights within the country as a whole, refused 
official independence. As a result, Africans living in these homelands needed passports to enter 
South Africa. Blacks became foreigners in their own country.
6 
Along with the Bantu Authorities Act, the Pass Laws Act enacted in 1952 influenced blacks‟ 
decisions about their residential choices because it required black South Africans over the age of 
16 to carry a pass book, known as a „dompas‟ („stupid pass‟ in Afrikaans), everywhere and at all 
times. The „dompas‟ was similar to a passport, but it contained pages filled with more extensive 
information than a normal passport. Within the pages of an individual‟s „dompas‟ were their 
fingerprints, photograph, personal details of employment, permission from the government to be 
in  a  particular  part  of  the  country,  qualifications  to  work  or  seek  work  in  the  area,  and  an 
employer's reports on worker performance and behavior. A pass, and the mobility that it afforded, 
was issued only to a black person with approved work. Spouses and children had to be left behind 
in non-white areas
7. Many white households empl oyed blacks as domestic workers  who were 
allowed to live on the premises  - often in small rooms external to the family home. If a worker 
displeased their employer and  their employer  in turn declined to endorse the book for the 
pertinent time period, the worker's right to stay in the area was jeopardized. A pass was issued for 
one „magisterial district‟ (usually one town) confining the holder to that area only.  As codified in 
the Pass Law, government officials possessed the power to expel the worker from the area by 
adverse endorsement in the passbook. This technique was known as „endorsing out‟ and could be 
carried out at any time and for any reason. Officials were not required to provide an explanation 
                                                 
6 Under apartheid, Africans were not allowed to be permanent residents in urban areas and could have legal 
residence only in „homelands‟. These homelands comprised 13 percent of the land area of South Africa.  
7 Although it is expected that family migration would increase after the demise of apartheid, in 1996 there 




for their actions. Forgetting to carry the „dompas‟, misplacing it, or having it stolen rendered one 
liable to arrest and imprisonment. Each year, over 250,000 blacks were arrested for technical 
offenses under the Pass Laws. As a result, the „dompas‟ became the most despised symbol of 
apartheid. 
The Bantu Education Act of 1953 was instituted to provide black students with different 
expectations and future goals than white students. These differences were incorporated to make 
sure  that  blacks  had  different  syllabi  and  schooling  facilities  than  white  children.  For  black 
students, the emphasis was placed on technical education, equipping them for practical work as 
opposed to the education received by white students, which equipped them for a professional job. 
Only a few of the black students in the public schools aspired to go beyond their mediocre 
training to higher education levels. Those who did possess higher ambitions were segregated into 
black universities under the Extension to University Education Act. Only 14 percent of black 
students reached secondary schools, and even fewer furthered their education at the university 
level. 
The South African government‟s official discrimination policy was strongly resisted from 
the earliest stages of apartheid. Through most of the 20th century, the African National Congress 
(ANC)  fought  the  Pretoria  regime  and  the  Nationalist  government  in  hopes  of  escaping  the 
domination of apartheid, colonialism, racism, and fascism. Their struggle came mainly in the 
form of peaceful protests. It was not until the 1960's that an armed struggle began. In 1961, the 
ANC and the South African Communist Party formed a people‟s army to fight the government.  
In the 1970‟s, the liberation of surrounding countries provided hope for the struggling South 
Africans. In the 1980‟s, the ANC, along with oppressed black South Africans, entered into a 
complete  revolution  against  the  government.  This  revolution  included  political  and  religious 




to these struggles and the implementation of UN sanctions in 1977, the government of South 
Africa was significantly weakened, but did not fall. 
 Although the system of pass laws was repealed in South Africa in 1986, apartheid was not 
abolished until the early 1990‟s.  More importantly, the repeal of the last discriminatory laws that 
affected the migration of black South Africans came into effect during June 1991.
8  In 1986, the 
United States Congress decided to involve itself in South African  politics by encouraging peace 
and supporting negotiations between the South African government, the ANC and their affiliates. 
The U.S. Congress‟ hoped that a democracy would be established in South Africa.  
In  1989,  F.W.  de  Klerk  became  the  president  of  South  Africa.  Instead  of  supporting 
apartheid,  which  was  expected,  he  proclaimed,  “white  domination  will  have  to  disappear. 
Otherwise there will never be peace in South Africa.”  In 1990, Nelson Mandela was released 
from  jail,  and  he  quickly  gained  supporters.  His  continued  determination  to  end  apartheid 
strengthened  the  movement  even  more.  As  a  result,  the  government  repealed  the  last  laws 
supporting apartheid in 1991, allowing democracy to be ushered into the country slowly but 
surely.  In 1993, de Klerk and Mandela shared the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in bringing 
peace to South Africa. 
This paper investigates the brain drain issue within South Africa after the formal end of 
apartheid between 1991 and 1996, with emphasis on the shifting of skilled workers. Although all 
blacks had been under the same discriminatory policy, the changes in the early 1990s  likely 
affected  blacks  with  different  degrees  of  skills  and  educational  attainments  quite  differently.   
Apartheid had placed many restrictions on the various aspects of blacks‟ life. Despite dramatic 
political, social and economic changes in the country (including the abolition of migration control 
measures such as influx control and the Group Areas Act), Kok et al. (2003) found no significant 
                                                 
8 One of the representative laws affecting the choice of localities is the Group Areas Act enacted in 1950, 
which established the distinct areas of South Africa in which members of each race could live and work. In 




changes in the overall level of migration between the periods 1975-1980 and 1992-1996. Very 
poor rural people, trapped in the legacy of the apartheid homeland policy, have probably found it 
difficult  to  escape  from  their  situations.    Furthermore,  since  low-skilled  blacks  worked  for 
industries like mining, construction and manufacturing sectors where they were not restricted to 
work even under the white government, we expect that relatively high-skilled blacks faced more 
opportunities after the end of the discriminatory policy.  
  In particular we expect that some areas lose highly educated blacks to receiving areas. 
Figure 1 plots for the districts the change in the proportion of the population with at least some 
matriculation  education  between  1991  and  1996  in  each  district  against  the  share  of  the 
population  with  at  least  some  post-matriculation  education  in  1991.    Areas  with  higher 
proportions of people with high school educations in 1991 experienced greater increases in the 
number of individuals with high schooling. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows another aspect of 
self-selection in migration. Workers migrate into areas where they can maximize their income 
based on educational attainments. While workers with high educational attainments choose areas 
with high returns to skill (education), low-educated workers choose the opposite.  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Most of the empirical work on internal migration is based on two seminal theoretical papers by 
Roy  (1951)  and/or  Sjaastad  (1962).  In  both  articles,  individuals  are  hypothesized  to  choose 
localities as they seek to maximize their income. Following those studies, individuals in our paper 
are  also  assumed  to  behave  to  maximize  their  income.  Greenwood  (1975)  provides  a 
comprehensive review of the literature on internal migration in the United States. As mentioned 
in  the  article,  distance  and  unemployment  rate  are also  critical  regional  characteristics  when 




Most  migrants  are  well  known  to  be  highly  motivated  and  more  educated  workers. 
Polachek  and  Horvath  (1977)  and  Plane  (1993)  find  that  migration  propensities  vary  over  a 
person‟s life cycle. Geographic mobility peaks when people are in their early to mid-twenties and 
then declines with age thereafter because the time horizon over which gains from migration can 
be realized grows shorter. These studies also find that the propensity to migrate increases with 
education.  Highly  educated  workers  operate  in  labor  markets  that  compete  across  broad 
geographic areas, whereas workers with low levels of education operate in more geographically 
isolated  labor  markets.  Workers  with  more  education  also  may  be  better  informed  about 
opportunities outside their local labor market and better able to evaluate that information. In that 
sense,  it  would  be  an  interesting  question  to  test  if  specific  areas  loose  their  highly 
skilled/educated workers to other areas – the issue of brain drain. 
Much of the migration literature has paid attention to self-selection issues in individuals‟ 
migration  decision.  Nakosteen and  Zimmer  (1980) described  a  model  where the  endogenous 
nature of the migration decision is explicitly recognized and thus fully accounts for the problem 
of migrant self-selection.  They were among the first to provide evidence of positive-selection 
into migration. Robinson and Tomes (1982) and Gabriel and Schmitz (1995) also find favorable 
self-selection. Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992), Dahl (2002), and Hunt and Mueller (2004) use a 
Roy model of comparative advantage to explain migration. Across regions in the United States, 
for example, wage distributions differ in their means and in their returns to skills (variance). 
Borjas et al. (1992) find evidence that higher-skilled individuals self-select into regions with 
higher returns to skills, conditional on mean wages. Conversely, they observed that lower-skilled 
individuals self-selected into regions with lower returns to skill, again conditional on mean wages. 
In more recent works, Dahl (2002) finds that correcting for selection bias substantially changes 
the estimated returns to education in a way that supports the role played by returns to skill in 




prediction that workers are self-selecting based on their educational attainment. Hunt and Mueller 
(2004) reconfirm the self-selection pattern consistent with the Roy model using both the U.S. and 
Canadian Census data.  
   Although  none  of  the  literature  we  reviewed  intended  to  test  either  the  income 
maximizing hypothesis in the decision of the location choice (Roy, 1951 and Sjasstad, 1962) or 
brain drain issue utilizing data on African countries, there is some literature on internal migration 
in South Africa. Some interesting findings are reported by Posel and Casale (2003). They found 
that labor migration in South Africa increased between 1993 and 1999. This rise was driven by 
the rising proportion of women leaving rural areas. Kok et al. (2003) comprehensively discuss 
many different issues relevant to the post-apartheid patterns of internal migration in South Africa 
from 1992 through 1996.   Inter-provincial migration is associated mainly with differentials in 
employment,  racial  dominance,  crime,  and  income  between  the  provinces  of  origin  and 
destination.  The South African results also show that migration decreases with age and increases 
with education, as found in many other studies.   
 
4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
In  our  model,  we  hypothesize  that  individuals  seek  to  maximize  their  expected  income  in 
choosing locations.  Further, we intend to test the brain drain issue by showing that individuals 
with  similar  levels  of  education  are  likely  to  cluster  at  the  same  areas.  A  potential  migrant 
chooses between 354 possible locations. The outside option is to remain in the origin; the utility 
of this option is normalized to 0. The other (354-1) options in the potential migrant‟s choice set 
represent migrating to one of the remaining 353 districts in South Africa. The utility of the 
th i  
potential migrant, originating in district 
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SH j is the share of high schooling (at least some post-matriculation education) in area 
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Uij 0  for j o.  
We assume that the worker will choose the area  j  that maximizes his or her utility.  The random 
utility  model  indicates  that  we  need  to  estimate  counterfactual  wages  of  individual 

i  across 
potential  locations.  We  e xplain  below  why  the  number  of  potential  locations  is  (318 -1) 
magisterial districts. 
The wage of individual 

i in area 

j can be estimated by the following Mincerian-style log 
wage equation  
(3) 

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where  

EDU highest school class completed 
 

AGE  age  

MS marital status 
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uij represent coefficient vectors of observable characteristics and error term with 
mean zero respectively. We estimate Equation (3) with OLS separately  for each of the  354 
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





Equation 4 shows that the natural log of the expected wage for individual in district j will be a 
function of the estimated returns to a characteristic and the individual‟s own characteristic.  
However,  the  expected  wage  does  not  include  the  error  term,  which  itself  can  be 
interpreted as the total gain or loss in wages associated with the unobserved characteristics in 
Equation (3). To develop a measure of the contribution of characteristics unobserved by the 
econometrician, we need to compute each individual‟s own residual for each of the magisterial 
districts.  This cannot be directly estimated, because we can only get an estimate of the actual 
wage offered to the individual in the district where they actually work.  We do not observe the 
actual wage offers in the other 353 magisterial districts.  
We can  indirectly  come  up  with  an  estimate  of the  rate  of  return to  the  unobserved 
characteristics in each district using the following logic.  The error term can be decomposed 
further into   
(5) 

uij ij  j 
where 

ij denotes a normal standardized residual, while 

 j is the standard deviation of blacks‟ 
residual earnings (the price of unobserved skills) in magisterial district 

j.  Since 

Var uij   j
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We assume that the normal standardized residual of individual 

i (the unobservable skill level of 
individual 

i) is constant across different magisterial districts,  il ij   ˆ ˆ   (where 

j  l), to compute 
a counterfactual residual for individual 





 (7)   j ij ij u   ˆ ˆ ˆ    ( 354   ...,   1,    j ).  
Then, we can rewrite the utility function of an individual 

i in area 

j in Equation (1) as  
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In order to estimate this model, we must first specify a functional form of the utility 
function. We assume the linear random utility model, which leads to the function  
(9)      ij j j j j ij ij ij CR D UR SH u w U                    

6 5 4 3 2 1 ln   ˆ ln . 
The key parameters of interest in our utility function are the marginal utility/disutility of the 
expected wage and the share of high schooling (

1 and 3) in area 

j to the potential migrants. As 
in  Sjaastad  (1962),  higher  regional expected  income  generates  greater  utility  to  the  potential 
migrants.  If internal migration within South Africa after the formal end of apartheid caused a 
brain  drain, the  coefficient  of  the share  of  people  in  the  area  with  at  least  some  high  school 
education should be positive for relatively highly educated individuals, but negative for the low 
educated  ones.  Additionally,  we  estimate  the  marginal  disutility  to  the  potential  migrant  of 
distance traveled to the destinations, unemployment rates, and crime rates. We include 

ij, an 
idiosyncratic error term representing the unobserved utility to each choice to the individual model.     
When  the  data  consist  of  choice -specific  attributes  instead  of  individual -specific 
characteristics, a conditional logit model can be utilized to estimate the coefficients above. Let 

Yij 
represent a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if individual  i  from origin 

o chooses to migrate 
into region  j , and zero otherwise. McFadden (1973) shows that if the 

ij terms are distributed 
extreme value type 1,  
(10) 

F ij  exp e
ij   , 
then the probability of the representative individual choosing the 

j






Pr Yij 1  
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 for j o  
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where       ` ln   ˆ ln 6 5 4 3 2 1 j j j j ij ij ij CR D UR SH u w            
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       . 
This conditional logit model can then be estimated by maximum likelihood, where the 
log likelihood function is  
(13)        
 
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We use data from the 1996 South African census to examine the migration patterns after the 
elimination  of  apartheid.  The  1996  Population  Census  is  a  10%  unit  level  sample  of  (a)  all 
households  and  (b)  all  persons  as  enumerated  in  South  Africa.  Since  this  study  investigates 
location choice, it is essential to understand the geographic hierarchy because an analysis of 
migration  patterns  will  generate  varying  results  depending  on  the  definition  of  migrant.  
Moreover,  the  geographical  unit  selected  for  the  analysis  will  influence  how  we  define  our 
migrants
9.  At the broadest level, South Africa is composed of nine geographic provinces. At the 
most detailed level, there are 354 magisterial districts spread over the nine provinces.  The 
magisterial district level of activity was chosen as a geographic unit for our analysis because the 
1996 South African census reports each individual‟s residential location at the magisterial district 
                                                 
9 None of the geographic categories in the South African Census can identify whether an area is restricted 
or unrestricted under the apartheid system. For instance, there could be both restricted and unrestricted 




level for both the current residence as well as previous residences.
 10 Moreover, there are quite a 
large number of people who moved into new  districts since 1992, which coincided with  the 
demise of Apartheid.  According to the 1996 census (see table 2), 14.5% of black South Africans 
changed their location across magisterial districts during our four-year period of study, between 
1992 and 1996.  As Table 3 indicates the migration rates are higher when we focus only on the 
employed black South Africans for the same period of time.         
  Although we only focus on the migration patterns of black South Africans in this paper, 
the comparison of socioeconomic status across different ethnicities in South Africa will provide 
insight as to the extent to which  blacks were deprived of socioeconomic opportunities under 
apartheid. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the sample for black South Africans as well as 
other  races.    As  an  initial  observation,  it  is  important  to  note  that  blacks  in  1996  still  had 
relatively low socioeconomic status. Not only did they experience high unemployment rates, but 
they  were  also  less  educated  and  earned  much  less  than  other  individuals  from  other  ethnic 
groups.  The mean income levels of whites were roughly three times more than those of blacks.   
Figure 3 shows the comparison of income distribution between blacks and whites.  The black‟s 
distribution is skewed much more to lower incomes, centered on the fourth income category, 
while the white distribution is centered on the ninth income category.    
There are also a few important differences worth noting between black migrants and non-
migrants  (Table3).  We  find  that,  on  average,  the  movers  are  younger  than  the  non-movers 
(Sjaastad, 1962). Migrants are more educated and earn more than non-migrants. The employment 
rate variable suggests a sharp difference within the South African labor market in comparison 
with markets in other more developed countries.  The unemployment rate of blacks is 36% for the 
entire sample and movers are more likely to be employed (Sibanda and Zuberi, 2004).     
                                                 
10 The Census also provides geographic information for both the current residence as well as previous 
residences at a higher category such as provinces. However, since the province is too broad to serve as a 





5.1. VARIABLES   
 
In Tables 2 and 3, the extent to which South Africa is segregated depending on ethnicities is 
defined. Those individual characteristics are used to compute predicted wages and returns to 
unobservable characteristics as described in the previous section. However, for the regression 
analysis on the location choices, regional characteristics are used. In the following sub-section, 
we discuss in detail our definition of a migrant and the specifics of how variables are defined.    
 
5.1.1. MIGRANT                             
Our sample restricts black male workers to the cohort between ages 18 and 62 and includes only 
those who are paid employees, report positive monthly earnings and are not enrolled in school. 
We exclude female workers because their migration is likely to be tied to their spouse‟s choice, 
which is empirically confirmed in the family migration literature.  It appears that the results will 
be  attenuated  if  female  workers  are  included.
11  After  applying  some  more  reasonable 
restrictions
12, we end up with 34,778 observations on those who migrated (movers) and 162,542 
observations on those who remained in the same magisterial district during the study period (non-
movers).  We know the locations of households among 354 magisterial districts spread over nine 
provinces both in 1996 as well as the previous residential location of workers
13 who moved into a 
                                                 
11 The wife and children often move because of their relationship to the father/husband and not necessarily 
because of their own attempts to secure employment. The exclusion of the economically inactive allows us 
to reveal more about the role of economic imperatives in their behavior.  
12 Some blacks report a foreign country as their previous residential areas. We drop those from the analysis 
because we cannot compare the regional characteristics of magisterial districts to foreign countries.  
13 The South African Census has a slightly different questionnaire on the previous residence variable from 
the U.S. Census.  For example, while the U.S. Census asks about the residential information from five years 
ago, the South African Census collects information on the most recent migration activities. As a result of 
the wording of this question, if an individual migrated multiple times during a particular census period, 




new location between 1991 and 1996.
14  We will define migrants as individuals who migrated 
across magisterial districts after the demise of the Apartheid system, between 1992 and 1996.  
About 14.5% of black South Africans migrated across districts during the above period (see table 
3). While this mobility rate is higher than the rates for both Asian/Indian and Colored groups, the 
blacks‟ mobility is lower than the whites‟ mobility during the democratic era (See Table 2). Table 
3  shows  summary  statistics  for  the  employed  black  South  Africans  comparing  movers  with 
stayers.  According  to  the  Table,  a  higher  proportion  of  blacks  (17.6%)  migrated  across 
magisterial district among employed blacks in South Africa.   
 
5.1.2. PREDICTED LOG WAGES 
Economic models based on Roy (1951) and Sjaastad (1962) predict that individuals choose areas 
where  they  can  maximize  their  expected  income.    There  are  two  main  factors  that  affect 
individuals‟ expected incomes: area effects and individual characteristics. As described in section 
4, equation (3) is first estimated to obtain the coefficient estimates used to compute the predicted 
log wages for each individual i in district j  in equation (4).  Then we also compute returns to 
unobservable characteristics across 354 magisterial districts for each individual. Although there 
are 354 magisterial districts in South Africa, we were unable to include all those districts in our 
analysis because 36 out of 354 include fewer than 30 observations in the sample. We drop those 
magisterial districts to reduce measurement error in estimating district expected wages so that the 
actual number of magisterial districts used in the study is 318.   
The 1996 census provides individual characteristics in equation (3), but the detailed wage 
information for each individual is unavailable. In the South African Census, however, income 
from all sources for the 12 months preceding the census is reported. Other income sources might 
                                                 
14 In the South African Census of 1996, the respondent was asked for the year in which the person moved 





be additional work activities, remittances from family members living elsewhere, state pensions 
or grants, other pensions or grants, as well as income from investments.  Although these issues 
could be solved to a degree by using other information such as whether one receives a pension or 
full-time or part-time employment status, we note that monthly income is coded in 14 categories: 
no income, 1-200 rand, …, 30,001 rand or more. We converted each category to its midpoint. 
However, the last interval of income category is open-ended
15. As Henson (1967) suggested, we 
utilized the Pareto Curve to estimate a mid-point of the open-ended interval, and the last interval 
is converted into  42,007  rand.
16 After taking  the  log  of  the  converted  income  variable,  we 
estimate the parameters in equation (3) for each of the magisterial districts. Then by using the 
estimated  parameters,  we  computed  the  log  predicted  wage  of  each  individual  for  (318-1) 
potential magisterial district as well as the predicted wage for their current area.  
 
5.1.3. RETURNS TO UNOBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS/SKILLS 
There still exists a discrepancy between the predicted wages and actual wages in the previous 
section. It is reasonable to expect that individuals respond to differences across districts in the 
returns to characteristics (skills) that the econometrician cannot observe when they choose to 
move to a magisterial district. As described in section (4), we estimate the returns to unobservable 
characteristics for each individual to each of the magisterial districts. We normalized the residuals, 
                                                 
15 The last interval comprises less than .4 percent of the total number of observations. So it seems that this 
open-ended interval may not play a significant role.   
16 The median value for the open-ended category can be calculated by:  
   i
v X MD
/ 301 . 10   
where  i X  is the lower limit of the open-ended category. And v  can be calculated by taking the log of the 
percentage of people in the open-ended category plus the percentage of people in the category immediately 
preceding the open-ended one minus the log of the former number, divided by the log of the lower limit of 
the open-ended category minus the log of the lower limit of the category immediately preceding the open-
ended one. We used this formula to estimate v  prior to calculating the median value:  
   
   
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which is why the summary statistics in Table 3 show a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one. When the own residuals are multiplied by the estimated return to unobservable skills in 
Table 4, we now can compute returns to unobservable skills. Along with the predicted wages, 
these are expected to affect each individual‟s location choice.  
 
5.1.4. SHARE OF INDIVIDUALS WITH AT LEAST SOME MATRICULATION 
Ultimately we intend to investigate the brain drain issue within South Africa after the formal end 
of apartheid. Rather than including the interaction term between the shares of high schooling in 
each  district  and  each  individual‟s  schooling  level,  we  divide  our  sample  into  two  groups:  
individuals with at least some matriculation in high school and ones who did not attend high 
school.   As displayed in Figure 4, the proportion of workers with at least some matriculation is 
about 6% among black South Africans.  For the internal migration to have contributed to a brain 
drain phenomenon, we should expect to see that blacks with more schooling are more likely to 
choose areas where the share of the population with some high school is higher.   In contrast, less 
educated blacks  will tend to  disfavor the areas with high shares of the population with  high 
schooling. Figure 1 provides some weak evidence of the brain drain phenomena, i.e. areas with 
relatively low shares of high school grads in 1991 experienced smaller growth in the high school 
share between 1991 and 1996 and even some negative change. On the other hand as the 1991 
high school share rises, the incidence of negative growth drops off in favor of positive growth.                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                      
5.1.5. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
While black unemployment in South Africa remains a significant issue, it is a well-known fact 
that  the  country  experienced  very  high  unemployment  during  the  study  period.  Hence  the 
variations in unemployment rates across magisterial districts should be a significant factor to 




might  be  expected  to  experience  both  more  out-migration  and  less  in-migration.  Our 
unemployment variable is constructed from Census 1996 at the magisterial district level as one 
minus the number of employed black South Africans divided by the number of black South 
Africans in the labor force.  
 
5.1.6. DISTANCE   
As a number of researchers point out, distance is another important factor to be considered in a 
migration model.  The fact that migration to a more distant area is lower has been attributed to the 
fact that distance serves as a proxy for both transportation and psychic costs of movement, as well 
as for the availability of information (Greenwood, 1975). The distance between the previous and 
the current location for each individual is proxied by the distance between two centroids of the 
previous and new districts.
17 Table 5 displays the distance measure. Although it does not provide 
interpretable measures, it is worthwhile to consider how educational attainment is correlated with 
migration  distance.  Contrary  to  what  we  would  expect,  on  average,  higher  educational 
attainments reduce the migration distance among black South African migrants  for this study 
period, 1992 - 1996.  
 
5.1.7. CRIME RATE 
Traditionally crime rates have been high in South Africa, and were so in the early 1990s. Hence, 
crime information could be a good potential non-economic component that people consider when 
choosing their residential location. In this study, we utilize crime data that were obtained from the 
South Africa Police Service (SAPS) in 1996. The crime information is a comprehensive database 
of crimes reported for the entire country by police precinct. It includes 37 different types of crime 
                                                 
17 South African Census 1996 provides GIS data file as a supplementary package. We created 354*354 




such as residential burglary, vehicle theft, serious assault, rape, armed robbery with aggravated 
circumstances, murder, etc. The relative crime level was computed by dividing the sum of the 
number of crimes reported by the population of each magisterial district.  Table 4 shows that 
there existed substantial variation of crime levels across districts in South Africa in 1996. As 
found by Kok et al. (2003), it is expected in this paper that relatively high crime rate would 
provide disutility to black South Africans.  
    
5.2. CONTEXTUAL DATA SET STRUCTURE    
 
The  contextual  data  structure  integrates  two  dimensions.  Consider  the  first  individual  in  the 
sample. This person has 

J 318 alternative destinations from which to choose (318 magisterial 
districts). So, for the first individual observation, there will be J rows in the data array. Each of 
these rows will contain area information. This data structure is repeated for all N  individuals in 
the sample. The total number of rows in the contextual data set is J N * . The dependent variable, 
ij Y , is equal to 1 if the individual i  chooses  j  as his locality. Under this data format, our sample 
should be multiplied by as many of the alternatives into which workers can migrate. Furthermore, 
normally census data sets are one of the largest among micro data sets. Since the siz e of our 
sample is constrained by the number of data array rows, we were unable to include the entire set 
of observations of people who did not matriculate in high school.  I developed a random sample 
for this group with the same number of observations as the group with high schooling, and then 
estimated the model. 
 





As  found  in  Nakosteen and  Zimmer  (1980),  there could  be a  positive  selection  among  non-
migrants.  Robinson and Tomes (1982) and Gabriel and Schmitz (1995) also find favorable self-
selection. Then our predicted log wage and estimated returns to unobservable characteristics can 
be  biased  estimates.  We  admit  that  our  economic  variables  are  not  free  from  this  type  of 
endogeneity.  
  Other  issues  arise  related  to  the  timing  of  data  collection.    Migrants  in  this  study 
determined their migration and location decision between 1992 and 1996. However, regional 
characteristics such as unemployment rates and crime rates were collected in 1996.  There may be 
some simultaneity bias that arises from using information on the districts at the end of the period.   
 
6. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
To identify the marginal utility of the model in Equation (9), conditional logit (CLOGIT) models 
are estimated by maximum likelihood. To ensure continuity with the prediction of our empirical 
model,  the  coefficient  of  the  expected  wage, 

1 ,  is  expected  to  be  positive  regardless  of 
educational attainments because workers  are assumed to prefer higher income , conditional on 
other regional characteristics. Although the effect of other regional characteristics are interesting, 
our analysis of the brain drain phenomena causes us to focus more of our discussion on the 
coefficient of the share of high schooling in equation (9).  If people tend to cluster in areas where 
others have similar levels of education, the coefficient of the share of high schooling, 

3, should 
be positive for the group with high levels o f education, holding other regional characteristics 
constant. However, a high share of the population with high schooling would provide disutility to 
those with low levels of education.  
The set of estimated coefficients are reported in Table 6 and 7 for two different samples 




the model to check the robustness of the main coefficients of interest.   The coefficients in Table 
6 for workers who did not matriculate in high school have signs consistent with our predictions.  
Although both high expected wage and returns to unobservable characteristics generate positive 
utility to workers, as predicted in Sjaastad (1962), returns to unobservable characteristics are 
statistically insignificant. In terms of other amenities, distance, unemployment rates, and crime 
rate  consistently  engender  disutility.  More  importantly,  the  coefficient  of  the  share  of  high 
schooling in area 

j minus the share of high schooling in the origin is negative and statistically 
significant  across  various  specifications.  This  result  is  consistent  with  our  expectation  that 
individuals with low levels of education disfavor areas with populations with a high share of high 
schooling.  
To examine further the issue of brain drain, we need also to check the response of people 
with high levels of education to the share of high schooling.  The results in Table 7 are based on 
the regressions with the sample where everybody has had at least some matriculation in high 
school.    More  highly  educated individuals  migrate into areas  where  they  can obtain  a  higher 
predicted wage.   High unemployment rates engender disutility to workers, and people tend to 
migrate shorter distances.  
Another form of human capital would be higher levels of skill that we have not been able 
to measure directly. Based on migration theory we would expect that people with higher levels of 
this unmeasured skill would move to areas where the returns are higher. Our measure of returns 
to this unmeasured skill is the standard deviation of the residuals from the wage regression in 
each area. Contrary to our expectation, however, the coefficient on the standard deviation of the 
residual is negative in Table 6.   
Our main focus is on the coefficient of the share of the high schooling variable from 
which we can confirm whether the removal of apartheid contributed to a brain drain from sending 




attracted  to  areas  where  a  higher  percentage  of  people  had  some  high  school  education.   
Therefore, the migration contributed to a reshuffling of the distribution of more educated people 
toward areas with more educated populations. 
                    
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The repeal of the Apartheid laws occurred between 1986 and June 1991. In this paper, we use the 
traditional Roy (1951) and Sjaastad (1962) models to examine the patterns of internal migration 
within South Africa during the democratic era. Although there are several works on internal 
migration issues in South Africa
18, our study is the first to investigate black South Africans ‟ 
migration from the prospective of an income-maximizing hypothesis model. In addition to testing 
the hypothesis of individuals‟ income-maximizing behavior, we implement additional analyses of 
the  consequence  of  internal  migration  within  South  Africa  after  the  formal  elimination  of 
apartheid with emphasis on brain drain issue. The study also provides new information about 
internal migration in a developing country, where a large share of the population has lived in 
segregated, poverty-ridden areas.     
Our findings are consistent with the general economic models that predict that people 
migrate in responses to changes in expected income.  Migrants tended to be more educated and 
the  shifts  after  the  end  of  apartheid  led  to  a  redistribution  of  the  residences  of  people  with 
different  education  levels.  Further,  there  are  signs  more  educated  blacks,  freed  from  the 
constraints of Apartheid, tended to move to areas where there were higher percentages of the 
population with some high schooling, while those who had not attended high school tended to 
                                                 
18 Kok et al. (2003) show that while three provinces, Gauteng, Western Cape, and Mpumalanga, attract 
more workers and indicate positive net migration rates the rest of other six provinces in South Africa lose 




find areas where the population was less educated more attractive.  Thus, the migration process 
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Figure 1: Scatter diagram relating the change in the share of high schooling  
from 1991 to 1996 with the share of high schooling in 1991 
 
Note: since indivuals are more likely to upgrade their education at their 
young age, we restrict our sample above age 23 for this figure. The line 
indicates a quadratic fitted line weighted with the population of each 




Figure 2: Scatter diagram relating the change in the share of high schooling  







   
Figure 3: 
Comparison of Income Distributions between Blacks and Whites 
 
Note: monthly income is coded into 14 categories in the census 1996 of 
South Africa: no income, 1-200 rand, …, 30,001 rand or more. Figure 2 
displays the income distribution of blacks and whites for those who 
























































Table 1: Laws under Apartheid 
Name of laws  Description 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949-
1985) 
prohibited marital union between persons of different races.  
Immorality Act (1950-1985)  made it a criminal offence for a white person to have any sexual relations with a 
person of a different race. 
Population Registration Act (1950-1991)  required all citizens to be registered as black, white, coloured or Indian.  
Suppression of Communism Act (1950-1993)  banned organizations that supported communism. Most of the Act was repealed in 
1982 and in 1991, with the last provisions of it repealed in 1993. 
Group Areas Act (1950-1991)  partitioned the country into different areas, with different areas being allocated to 
different racial groups. This law represented the very heart of apartheid because it was 
the basis upon which political and social separation was to be constructed.  
Bantu Authorities Act (1951)  created separate government structures for black people.  
Native Building Workers Act (1951)  blacks not to perform skilled construction. 
Native Services Levy Act (1952)  imposes monthly taxes on employers of urban blacks 
Pass Law Act (1952-1986)  made it compulsory for all black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a "pass 
book" at all times. 
Amendments to the Native Consolidation Act 
(1952, 1955, and 1957) 
restrictions on blacks in urban areas, could only remain without a pass under special 
conditions. 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
(1953-1989) 
prohibited people of different races from using the same public amenities. 
Natives (Settlement of Disputes) Act (1953)  bars blacks from registering trade unions. 
Bantu Education Act (1953)  brought all black schooling under government control, ending mission-run schools. 
Bantu Urban Areas Act (1953)  curtailed black migration to the cities. 
Mines and Work Act (1956)  formalized racial discrimination in employment. 
Native Administration Act (1956)  permits government to send Africans into exile in remote parts of the country. 
Promotion of Black Self-Government Act 
(1959-1993) 
set up separate territorial governments in the homelands, designated lands for black 
people where they could have a vote. The aim was that these bantustans would 
eventually become independent of South Africa. 
Bantu Investment Corporation Act (1959)  set up a mechanism to transfer capital to the homelands in order to create jobs in the 
black homelands. 
Extension of University Education Act (1959)  created separate universities for Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians. 
Physical Planning and Utilisation of 
Resources Act (1959) 
allowed the government to stop industrial development in 'white' cities and redirect 
such development to homeland border areas. The aim was to speed up the relocation of 
blacks to the homelands by relocating jobs to homeland areas. 
Prohibition of Political Interference Act 
(1968) 
racially mixed parties are illegal. 
Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1970)  job reservation - made possible the prohibition of the employment of blacks in any job, 
in any area or in the service of any employer. 
Black Homeland Citizenship Act (1970)  changed the status of the inhabitants of the 'homeland' so that they were no longer 
citizens of South Africa. The aim was to ensure whites became the demographic 
majority within South Africa. 








Table 2: Summary Statistics– Comparison across Different Ethnicities 
   Black  Colored  Indian/Asian  White 
Unemployed  0.360  0.173  0.113  0.041 
  (0.48)  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.20) 
Monthly wage   1385.65  1804.50  3164.06  6317.35 
  (1753.34)  (2098.33)  (3568.13)  (6508.65) 
LN(wage)  6.787  7.093  7.699  8.352 
  (0.99)  (0.93)  (0.86)  (0.96) 
Migrant  0.145  0.108  0.103  0.210 
  (0.35)  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.41) 
Years of Schooling  7.041  8.266  10.906  12.423 
  (4.27)  (3.61)  (2.73)  (2.47) 
Age  35.432  34.431  35.774  37.606 
  (10.43)  (10.67)  (11.13)  (11.29) 
Married   0.437  0.509  0.703  0.687 
  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.46)  (0.46) 
Part-time  0.052  0.069  0.061  0.038 
  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.19) 
N  388,113  61,751  20,619  76,300 
Note: standard deviation in parenthesis; unemployment rate is computed by following a 
standard definition, the number of employed divided by those who are in the labor force; 




Table 3: Summary Statistics - Employed Black Population 
  Entire sample  Movers  Stayers 
   Mean  STD  Mean  STD  Mean  STD 
Area unemployment rate  0.360  (0.480)  0.248  (0.432)  0.379  (0.485) 
Wage  1385.894  (1592.451)  1453.809  (1813.804)  1371.362  (1540.583) 
LN(wage)  6.828  (0.949)  6.862  (0.939)  6.821  (0.951) 
Migrant  0.176  (0.381)  1.000  (0.000)  0.000  (0.000) 
Years of schooling  7.231  (4.331)  7.730  (4.251)  7.124  (4.341) 
Age  36.845  (10.034)  33.584  (9.111)  37.542  (10.085) 
Married   0.547  (0.498)  0.473  (0.499)  0.562  (0.496) 
Part-time   0.068  (0.252)  0.084  (0.277)  0.065  (0.247) 
Own residuals  0.004  (1.004)  0.011  (1.008)  0.003  (1.003) 
   197,320  34,778  162,542 
Note: standard deviation in parenthesis; the sample is restricted to those only who are paid workers, 












Table 4: Regional Characteristics 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Returns to education  318  0.091  0.037  -0.007  0.190 
Mean of predicted wage  318  6.626  0.621  4.352  8.192 
Price to unobservable skills  318  0.801  0.109  0.194  1.119 
Share of high schooling  318  0.051  0.042  0.000  0.207 
Unemployment rate  318  0.342  0.190  0.000  0.830 
Crime rate  318  0.640  0.455  0.006  3.279 
Note: crime data were obtained from the South Africa Police Service in 1996; the relative crime level was 




Table 5: Mean Distance for Migrants  
   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Primary or less  14,721  2.04  2.52  0.05  15.20 
Some secondary  12,140  1.75  2.32  0.05  15.22 
Secondary  5,654  1.62  2.06  0.07  14.88 
 Secondary +  2,206  1.48  2.05  0.07  15.56 
Total  34,721  1.83  2.36  0.05  15.56 
































Table 6: Conditional Logit Regression - Sample with Less than High School 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Predicted log wage in j minus predicted log wage in origin based 
on individual i's characteristics 
1.706  1.734  1.705  1.734 
(28.67)  (29.04)  (28.65)  (29.03) 
(Std. Dev. of residual in j minus Std. Dev. of residual in origin) 
times normalized residual for individual i in region j   
    0.190  0.161 
    (1.05)  (0.90) 
The share of high schooling in j minus the share of high schooling 
in origin 
-7.206  -5.162  -7.196  -5.156 
(-14.27)  (-9.57)  (-14.25)  (-9.56) 
Distance between region j and origin  -8.301  -8.317  -8.302  -8.318 
(-155.39)  (-154.4)  (-155.37)  (-154.38) 
Unemployment rate in region j minus unemployment rate in origin    -2.162    -2.160 
  (-13.19)    (-13.18) 
Crime rate in region j minus crime rate in origin    -0.391    -0.391 
  (-11.1)    (-11.1) 
N  10,929  10,929  10,929  10,929 
LR chi2  91998.98  92191.54  92000.08  92192.34 
Pseudo R2  0.7305  0.732  0.7305  0.732 






Table 7: Conditional Logit Regression - Sample with at least Some High School 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Predicted log wage in j minus predicted log wage in origin based 
on individual i's characteristics 
1.546  1.684  1.523  1.658 
(23.56)  (24.63)  (23.12)  (24.12) 
(Std. Dev. of residual in j minus Std. Dev. of residual in origin) 
times normalized residual for individual i in region j   
    -0.920  -0.621 
    (-5.25)  (-3.5) 
The share of high schooling in j minus the share of high schooling 
in origin 
3.287  3.489  3.501  3.662 
(6.85)  (6.66)  (7.28)  (6.96) 
Distance between region j and origin  -7.446  -7.441  -7.440  -7.436 
(-158.04)  (-157.67)  (-157.88)  (-157.53) 
Unemployment rate in region j minus unemployment rate in origin    -1.447    -1.384 
  (-9.18)    (-8.72) 
Crime rate in region j minus crime rate in origin    -0.350    -0.329 
  (-10.15)    (-9.41) 
N  10,928  10,928  10,928  10,928 
LR chi2  90626.49  90745.36  90654.15  90757.68 
Pseudo R2         0.7196  0.7206  0.7198  0.7207 
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